The U.S. government issued a National Intelligence Estimate report yesterday that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. (click here for report)

The report is not clear as to whether Iran has permanently and completely stopped its quest or whether the cessation of a nuclear program is temporary. The report, which is being hailed as proof that the Bush administration has been wrong about its approach to Iran, actually supports the Bush approach to Iran.

The key findings of the estimate:

• The NIE is "moderately confident" Tehran has not restarted the program.
• The NIE expresses moderate to high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear program.
• The NIE assessment: Tehran stopped the program in response to international pressure.
• The NIE has low confidence that Iran has at least some weapons-usable fissile material.
• The NIE asserts the likelihood that Iran would use centrifuge enrichment to produce fissile material it the country does attempt to build a nuclear weapons program.
• The NIE has established that Iran made significant progress installing centrifuges in Natanz in 2007.
• The NIE acknowledges it is technically possible for Iran to have enough Highly Enriched Uranium for a weapon in late 2009.
• Intelligence estimates that Iran may have the capability of producing a weapon sometime between 2010 - 2015.
• The NIE has established that Iran has continued its civilian uranium enrichment program.
• The NIE notes that since the fall of 2003 Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications that may be of use in a nuclear weapon program.
• The NIE has determined that Tehran has taken a cost-benefit approach to its nuclear quest. This supports the notion that international pressure may be enough to eliminate Iran as a nuclear threat.
• The NIE acknowledges that any current decision by Iran to halt its nuclear program is inherently reversible.
• The NIE has moderate confidence that Iran would use covert facilities to produce HEU.
• The NIE is highly confident that Iran will not be technically capable of producing a weapon until 2015.
• The NIE is highly confident that Iran has the capacity to produce a nuclear weapon if it decides to do so.

While many in opposition to Bush seem to be declaring this report proof of failure in Iran, I wonder if they have actually read the whole report. (It is not long, so cliffs notes and talking points should not be necessary for those who can read...)

My take on the report:

• The U.S. presence in Iraq had a clear impact on the decisions made by Tehran.
• The international pressure credited by the NIE are the result of the clear positions taken by the Bush administration to hold Tehran accountable for any missteps it might decide to take.
• Iran has carefully managed its ongoing efforts to maintain its nuclear potential by utilizing covert facilities and civilian capabilities.
• Iran's continued development of centrifuges is a clear indication of its long term aspirations.
• The estimates that Iran will be nuclear capable by 2010-2015 despite the claim that no program currently exists will be changed dramatically if Iran chooses to actively restart the program.
• The continued and constant pressure on Iran to avoid the pursuit of nuclear capability cannot waiver.

People like Senator Kennedy ought to be ashamed for insinuating that the Bush approach has been irresponsible. It has been the pressure placed on Iran by the Bush Administration that has led us to this point. Kennedy and his democratic cohorts should praise the success of the policies on Iran and pledge to maintain the pressure on Iran indefinitely.

The attempt to politicize this situation, and misrepresent the findings of the report, does nothing to promote the security of the United States.

The security of the United States should be the number one priority for all of our congressional leaders, party politics aside.